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INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE'

Amici seek to ensure equity remains a viable
enforcement tool for courts to fulfill the statutory
purposes embodied in the National Environmental
Policy Act (NEPA) and other environmental laws. If
Petitioners' view prevails, amici fear courts will
foreclose injunctive relief unless environmental harms
are proven more likely than not to occur, an unmerited
departure from equity's traditional role. For these
reasons, two former General Counsels to the Council on
Environmental Quality (CEQ) and seven law professors
submit this amicus curiae brief in support of
Respondents Geertson Seed Farms, et al.
Amici Dinah Bear and Gary Widman are former

General Counsels to CEQ in the Executive Office of the
President whose service extends throughout much of
the lifetime of NEPA'
Their combined experience
interpreting and implementing NEPA spans five
presidential administrations.
Ms. Bear and Mr.
Widman remain strongly committed to promoting
NEPA's faithful enforcement.

Amici Robert Glicksman, Oliver Houck, Daniel
Mandelker, Thomas McGarity, Robert Percival,
Zygmunt Plater, and Nicholas Robinson are law
I Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 37.3, the parties have
consented to the ftlin g of this brief, and letters of consent have
been fil ed with the Clerk of this Court. Pursuant to Supreme
Court Rule 37.6, amici state that no coun sel for any party in this
case authored this brief in whole or in part, and no person or
entity other than amici and their counsel has made a monetary
contribution to the preparation a nd submission of this brief.
1 More detailed biographies of amici former General Counsels to
CEQ are included in Appendix A.
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professors from across the United States, each of whom
has taught environmental, natural resources, and
administrative law in excess of twenty years-in one
case for over fIfty years. 3 Their vast scholarship
includes over two hundred law review articles, six
casebooks, and the leading treatise on NEPA law.
Although law professors often write about what law
should be established, here they write to defend law
that is already well-established.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
District courts have broad discretion to tailor
remedies to the circumstances of the case, and
appellate courts should not, and historically have not,
lightly cast aside the reasoned judgment made by the
judge who has weighed the facts and balanced the
equities fIrst hand. Petitioners have not shown that
the district court's fmdings of fact, taken largely from
the administrative record, were clearly erroneous.
Releasing Roundup Ready alfalfa into the environment
without completing an environmental analysis would
have exposed Respondents to a real and immediate
threat of biological contamination, an environmental
injury that is irreparable. Equitable relief does not
require plaintiffs to show a near-certainty of
irreparable harm, which amounts to a virtually
impossible standard for future injuries. Indeed, courts
have traditionally exercised their discretion to issue
injunctions that avoid future harm where there is a
real and immediate threat of harm.

3 More detailed biographies of amici law professors are included in
Appendix A.
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By enforcing the statutory procedures of the
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). the district
court respected the deliberately expressed judgment of
Congress. As this Court recognized in Tennessee Valley
Authority u. Hill. 437 U.S. 153 (1978), while equity
courts enjoy broad discretion, that discretion does not
extend so far as to give district courts authority to
ignore a statute's principal objectives. Although the
district court did not have an absolute duty to issue the
injunction, the district court did not abuse its discretion
by declining to issue the injunction proposed by the
Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS).
Aiter balancing the four equity factors, the remedy
chosen by the district court preserved the opportunity
for APHIS to comply with NEPA's twin aims of
informed decisionmaking and public participation.
Moreover, APHIS's proposed injunction would have
und ermined these two objectives by allowing APHIS to
implement a decision first and then analyze it later.
ARGUMENT
Monsanto Company's petition to deregulate
Roundup Ready alfalfa has not satisfied the procedural
requirements Congress imposed before a potential
"plant pest" can be released into the environment. In
this case, the Plant Protection Act (PPA) defines the
status quo: regulated plants, including genetically
modified plants. cannot be released into the
environment without a permit. 7 U.S.C. § 7712; 7
C.F. R. § 340.0(a)(2) n.l. Genetically modified plants
can be deregulated, but a decision to deregulate must
include an environmental analysis in compliance with
NEPA, which requires agencies to disclose and analyze
the full range of reasonably foreseeable environmental
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impacts before implementing a decision that
irreversibly or irretrievably commits resources to a
course of action. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C); 7 C.F.R.
§ 372.5(b)(4).
To comply with NEPA, APHIS's
regulations require "early and adequate consideration
of environmental factors in [APHIS's] planning and
decisionmaking." 7 C.F.R. § 372.L
Past examples of ecological devastation wrought
by the unwitting introduction of plant and animal pests
into the environment illustrate the wisdom of
prohibiting the commercial sale and widespread
distribution of genetically modified plants until APHIS
finishes its NEPA analysis and concludes that the
newly created plants are not "plant pests." See 7
U.S.C. § 7711(a); 7 C.F.R. § 340.0(a)(2) n.L ''There are
reasons for believing (the experience with the
introduction of non-native species) is pertinent to the
assessment of risks associated with the deliberate
release of organisms that have been modified by
engineering."
William H. Rodgers, Jr., Rodgers'
Environmental Law § 6:12 (A) (Supp. 2009). Yet,
Monsanto Company and its licensee Forage Genetics
(collectively "Monsanto"), argue that the district court
abused its discretion by rejecting a proposed injunction
that would allow Roundup Ready alfalfa to be released
into the environment on a commercial scale before
APHIS finishes its NEPA analysis. However, APHIS's
flawed NEPA analysis failed to analyze specific,
threatened environmental harms, like biological
contamination and the development of glyphosateresistant weeds. Therefore, the district court's decision
to preserve the status quo while APHIS corrected its
errors was not an abuse of discretion.

o

I.

THE DISTRICT COURT'S INJUNCTION
BALANCED THE INTERESTS OF THE
PARTIES WHILE ENFORCING THE
PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS OF
NEPAAND PPA.

The characteristics of flexibility and practicality
allow courts in equity to tailor remedies to the
circumstances of the individual case. See Hecht Co. v.
Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 329 (1944) ("Flexibility rather
than rigidity" distinguishes equity jurisdiction.).
Appellate courts do not lightly cast aside the factual
findings or the equitable balances reached by district
courts. They reject factual findings only where they
are clearly erroneous and upset the balance struck by
the district court only where there has been an abuse of
discretion. eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547
U.S. 388, 391 (2006); see Found. on Econ. Trends v.
Heckler, 756 F.2d 143, 151·52 (D.C. Cir. 1985). These
standards of review are fundamental, and yet they are
conspicuously
absent
from
Petitioners'
brief.
Petitioners attempt to dodge these highly deferential
standards by attacking the district court's decision on
novel legal grounds, asserting error in the standard for
irreparable harm and in the evidentiary procedures
used by the district court. Though Petitioners disagree
with the balance struck by the district court, they have
not shown that the findings of fact , taken largely from
the administrative record, were clearly erroneous. Nor
have they shown that the balance reached, after the
court carefully a pplied the traditional four· factor test
and weighed the equities between the parties, was an
abuse of discretion.

6
A. The risk of cross-contaminatioD
caused by releasing Roundup Ready
alfalfa created a likelihood of
irreparable
harm that justified
injunctive relief.
Injunctive relief. by definition, is forwardlooking. Doug/as v. City of Jeanette, 319 U.S. 157, 165
Thus, equity has traditionally sheltered
(1943).
plaintiffs from real threats of future wrongs that
imperiled the plaintiffs' interests. See, e.g., United
Steelworkers of Am. v. United States, 361 U.S. 39,40·42
(1959) (enjoining strike because, if the strike continued,
it would create further delay in steel production, and
delay would imperil national health and safety); 42
Am. Jur. 2d Injunctions § 2 (Supp. 2010) ("Injunctive
relief is designed to meet a real threat of a future
wrong or a contemporary wrong of a nature likely to
continue or recur."); see also O'Shea v. Littleton, 414
U.S. 488, 496 (1974) ("[PJast wrongs are evidence
bearing on whether there is a rea l and immediate
threat . .. .").

Though equity sometimes remedies present
harm, its principal remedial effect is prospective,
guarding against future harm despite the future's
inherent uncertainty. See United States u. W. T. Grant
Co. , 345 U.S. 629, 633 (1953) ("The purpose of an
injunction is to prevent future violations .. . ."); United
States v. Or. State Med. Socy, 343 U.S. 326, 333 (1952)
(,'The sole function of an action for injunction is to
forestall future violations.").
Equitable relief has
guarded a village against dam failure, obtained
treatment for orphans at risk for neurological illness,
and even ensured that the Seattle Supersonics had
their star basketball player, Spencer Haywood, for the
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upcoming NBA playoffs. See Warm Springs Dam Task
Force u. Gribble, 417 U.S. 1301 (Douglas, Circuit
Justice 1974); Friends for All Children, Inc. u. Lockheed
Aircraft Corp., 746 F.2d 816 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Haywood
u. NBA, 401 U.S. 1204 (Douglas, Circuit Justice 1971),
respectively.
The extent to which the threat of future harm
imperils the plaintiffs interest, i.e., the significance of
the risk, has always been a question for the trial court's
equitable discretion. For example, commentators agree
that a lower probability of an extremely grave
irreparable harm may entitle a plaintiff to injunctive
relief where the same probability of a more minor
irreparable harm would not. See llA Charles Allen
Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and
Procedure § 2948 (2d ed. 1982) (courts should consider
"the significance of the threat of irreparable harm"
(emphasis added)}; see generally Restatement (Second)
of Torts § 933(1} (1979), cmt. b (,'The more serious the
impending harm, the less justification there is for
taking the chances that are involved in pronouncing

the harm too remote.") ; eass R. Sunstein, Irreversible

and Catastrophic, 91 Cornell L. Rev. 841, 870 (2006)
(noting that a one-in-a-million chance that 200 million
people will die and a fifty-fifty chance that 400 people
will die both create an expected cost of 200 lives).
Risk is not harmless simply because the threat of
harm is not certain. See United States v. Carroll
Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947)
(establishing B<PL test for negligence liability that
considered the probability of future harm, i.e. , risk).
This Court noted over one hundred years ago that
federal courts can use their equitable powers to
"prevent nuisances that are threatened, and before
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irreparable mischief ensues . . . and, by perpetual
injunction, protect the public against them in the
future." Mugler u. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 673 (1887).
The law of anticipatory nuisance, for instance, offers
relief from prospective harm caused by a future
nuisance. even in the absence of past or present injury.
Plaintiffs need not prove they have already been
harmed, because "even threatened harm is actionable
under the federal common law of nuisance."
Connecticut u. Am. Elec. Power, 582 F.3d 309, 357 (2d
Cir.2009).

•

In light of this precedent, it was hardly novel,
much less an abuse of discretion, for the district court
to issue an injunction guarding against the future
irreparable harm of biological contamination where the
record established that the risk was "sufficiently
likely." Amoco Prod. Co. u. Vill. of Gambell, 480 U.S.
531, 545 (1987). Indeed, the facts before the district
court showed that this standard had been surpassed
because biological contamination had already occurred.
Pet.App. 13a, 61a. As the district court explained,
biological contamination from cross· pollination between
Roundup Ready alfalfa and organic alfalfa is
irreparable because "[t]he contamination cannot be
undone; it will destroy the crops of those farmers who
do not sell genetically engineered alfalfa. Moreover, it
is not a one season loss; alfalfa is a perennial crop and
once removed cannot be replanted for two to four
years." Pet.App. 71a. Once a conventional alfalfa
farmer's seed crop is contaminated, "there is no way for
the farmer to remove the gene from the crop or control
its further spread." Pet.App. 36a. Therefore, Judge
Breyer's
conclusion
that
irreversible
genetic

9
contamination of conventional alfalfa crops
irreparable harm was not clearly erroneous.

was

In addition to confirming irreparable harm, the
record amply supports Judge Breyer's finding that
biological contamination could occur, establishing a
'1ikelihood" of irreparable injury. It is undisputed that
cross-contamination could occur, and has occurred.
Pet.App. 61a ("APHIS acknowledged that gene
transmission could and had occurred with Roundup
Ready alfalfa."). APHIS's environmental assessment
acknowledged this risk and even analyzed the
possibility that gene transmission could eradicate all
other strains of alfalfa. Pet.App. 42a·43a.' It is also
undisputed that glyphosate-resistant weeds could
develop. Pet.App. 45a·46a. Finally, it is undisputed
that Roundup Ready alfalfa has been made
commercially available and that, absent an injunction,
its use would increase. S ee Pet.App. 64a. In addition
to these undisputed facts, the district court made
further factual findings.
"IGJene transmission is
especially likely in this context given the geographic
concentration of alfalfa seed production." Pet.App. 35a36a (emphasis added).
Thus, th e district court's

4 Petitioners take issue with the district court's "suggestion that
continued planting of (Roundup Ready alfalfa] could ~ liminate the
availability of conventional alfalfa."
Pet. Br. 34.
This
"suggestion," however, came from APHIS, not from the district
court. The possibility that gene transmission could eliminate the
ability to grow non-genetically engineered alfalfa is the reason
that APHIS analyzed the economic impacts that elimination of
organic or conventional alfalfa crops would have on farmers.
Pet.App . 44a-45a.
Additionally. an internal APHIS email
acknowledged that "it may be hard to guara ntee that seeds or
sprouts are GE free." Pet.App .38a.

10
conclusion that cross-contamination was sufficiently
likely was not clearly erroneous.
Though the record demonstrates that the district
court found a likelihood, not just a possibility, of
irreparable harm, Petitioners attack the court's legal
standard for irreparable harm by distorting the
language of the court's order. Throughout their brief,
Petitioners suggest that the district court's use of the
phrase "sufficiently likely" indicates that the court
applied an inappropriate "mere 'possibility'" standard.
Pet. Br. 19, 21, 41, 44. Yet "sufficiently likely" is
neither a lenient standard imposed by the Ninth
Circuit nor a radical invention of the district court: it
was this Court's own description of the proper standard
for the issuance of an injunction. See Amoco, 480 U.S.
at 545 ("If such injury is sufficiently likely, therefore,
the balance of harms will usually favor the issuance of
an injunction to protect the environment."). Nowhere
did the district court suggest that the mere possibility
of cross-pollination entitled the plaintiffs to an
lnJunction. If the court had applied a possibility
standard, it would not have needed a ten-page
memorandum to explain the justification for its
permanent injunction; a short order citing to APHIS's
environmental assessment-record evidence that
acknowledges (at a minimum) the possibility of gene
transmission-would have sufficed.
Pet.App. 45a.
Instead, the district court went much further, weighing
the facts and concluding that, in light of the close
geographic distribution of alfalfa crops and the fact
that gene transmission had already occurred, biological
contamination was sufficiently likely to occur under
APHIS's proposed injunction. See, e.g. , Pet.App. 61a,
70a, 71a; Pet.App. lOa, 13a.
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The Petitioners' misguided articulation of the
"likelihood" of irreparable harm standard stems from
their misreading of this Court's opinion in Winter u.
Natural Resources Defense Council, 129 S. Ct. 365
(2008), which they claim requires a near-certainty of
irreparable harm-a standard that would make a
forward-looking injunction nearly impossible. This
Court has never countenanced such a standard.
Indeed, although this Court has characterized the
likelihood standard slightly differently over the years,
the standard itself has never changed; it remains part
of the same equitable balancing test ''historically
employed by courts of equity." eBay, 547 U.S. at 390.
Compare Winter, 129 S. Ct. at 375 ("liIlely''), with
Amoco, 480 U.S. at 545 ("sufficiently likely") , with City
of Los Angeles u. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 111 (1983)
("likelihood"), and O'Shea, 414 U.S. at 502 (same), with
W. T. Grant, 345 U.S. at 633 ("cognizable danger ...
something more than the mere possibility").
Equity has never required a showing that
irreparable harm is more likely than not, and
Petitioners cite no case establishing such a bright line.
Several federal courts of appeals have interpreted this
Court's various descriptions of "likelihood" to mean
"significant risk," but there is no flXed line separating
significant risks from speculative ones. See Greater
Yellowstone Coal. u. Flowers, 321 F.3d 1250, 1258 (10th
Cir. 2003) ("[AJn injury is not speculative simply
because it is not certain to occur."); Adams u. Freedom
Forge Corp., 204 F.3d 475, 484·85 (3d Cir. 2000) (,'The
irreparable harm requirement is met if a plaintiff
demonstrates a significant risk that he or she will
experience harm that cannot adequately be
compensated after the fact by monetary damages.");
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Assoc. Gen. Contractors of Cal. , Inc. u. Coal. for Econ.
Equity, 950 F.2d 1401, 1410 (9th Cir. 1991) ("[Tlhe
party seeking the injunction must demonstrate that it
will be exposed to some significant risk of irreparable
injury.").

B. A new and unanalyzed activity can
create a sufficient likelihood of
irreparable harm.
The district court did not abuse its discretion by
rejecting an injunction that would have radically
altered the status quo before APHIS completed the
environmental analysis. APHIS's proposed injunctive
relief would have authorized exponential expansion of
Roundup Ready alfalfa production nationwide,
increasing the number of acres planted by five-fold in
less than a year. Pet.App. 64a. The district court
properly refused to endorse such dramatic growth of a
new and unanalyzed activity. especially when it found
biological contamination had already occurred under
planting conditions similar to those proposed in
APHIS's injunction.
Pet.App. 70a.
Neither
information gathered through analysis nor experience
supports APHIS's assertion that its injunctive
measures would avoid biological contamination.
A court is well within its equitable discretion to
enjoin an unprecedented activity from proceeding until
after a proper environmental analysis, required by
statute, has been conducted. See Found. on Econ.
Trends , 756 F.2d at 157. In Sierra Club u. Marsh,
then-Judge , now-Justice, Breyer noted that the "added
risk to the environment that takes place when
governmental decisionmakers make up their minds
without having before them an analysis (with prior
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public comment) of the likely effects of their decision
upon the environment" can create irreparable harm.
872 F.2d 497, 500 (1st Cir. 1989); see also
Massachusetts v. Watt, 716 F.2d 946, 952 (1st Cir.
1983) (Breyer, J.).

In Foundation on Economic Trends, the D.C.
Circuit upheld an injunction stopping the National
Institute of Health (NIH) from releasing new
genetically engineered bacteria into the environment
until after it completed an adequate NEPA analysis.
756 F.2d at 150. With reasoning remarkably similar to
that advanced by Petitioners in this case, NIH
acknowledged that the engineered bacteria could
multiply and disperse throughout the environment, but
argued that the likelihood of dispersion was low and,
therefore, did not analyze whether dispersion would
cause environmental injury. l d . at 153. Due to NIH's
"complete failure to address a major environmental
concern" before authorizing an unprecedented activity
that threatened environmental harm, id. at 154, the
D.C. Circuit upheld the injunction delaying the
proposed experiment. S
In contrast, In Winter,

& The district court actually enjoined two activities: (1) 8. specific
approval of the deliberate release of genetically modified
organisms; and (2) a policy change authorizing direct release
experiments. The D.C. Circuit upheld the injunction regarding
the fust activity, but concluded that the second injunction was
"overly broadn in part because the regulations did not make direct
release "an imminent possibility." Found. on Econ. Trends , 756
F.2d at 158. This result reflects the power of equity courts to
shape a remedy that can fulml the objectives of NEPA without
adversely affecting society by issuing an overly broad injunction.
See Wisconsin [). Weinberger, 745 F.2d 412, 426 (7th Cir. 1984)
(where NEPA violation was uncertain, and the only threatened
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experience weighed against the issuance of an
injunction where the Navy had not yet done a NEPA
analysis for training exercises that had been "taking
place in SOCAL for the last 40 years." See Winter, 129
S. Ct. at 376. In declining to issue an injunction, this
Court found it llpertinent" that the Navy was not
"conducting a new type of activity with completely
unknown effects on the environment." Id.
In this case, Petitioners cannot rely on either
analysis or experience to demonstrate that APHIS's
proposed m)unction would truly guard against
irreparable biological contamination. Pet.App. 69a-70a
("[Defendants] have not submitted any evidence that
suggests whether, and to what extent, the proposed
interim conditions will be followed, even though such
conditions are similar to those already imposed by
Forage Genetics in its contracts with Roundup Ready
seed growers and contamination has occurred despite
these conditions.").
This is not a case where the lack of information
is an injury that is suffered by all and so actionable by
none. Cr. Allen v. Wright , 468 U.S. 737, 751, 760 (1984)
(summarizing prior line of cases as representing the
principle that "absent an allegation of a specific threat
of being subject to the challenged practices, plaintiffs
had no standing to ask for an injunction"). To the
contrary, traditional seed farmers need the information
missing from the environmental assessment to protect
their crops from biological contamination-even if
Roundup Ready alfalfa is only partially deregulated.
summarily
concluded
that
biological
APHIS
injury was agency preference for a particular course of action, an
injunction was unwarranted} .
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contamination was "highly unlikely" if growers used
"quality control," but the agency did not explain or
identify any quality control measures that would
prevent gene transmission between neighboring seed
farms, nor did it analyze the burden that such
measures would impose on farmers of conventional
alfalfa. Pet.App. 31a, 41a. The informational injury
here is particularized and consequential, and it created
a sufficient likelihood of irreparable harm. Therefore,
the district court did not abuse its discretion by
delaying APHIS's foray into "uncharted territory,"
Pet.App. 45a, by requiring APHIS to finish a
meaningful NEPA analysis before deregulating
Roundup Ready alfalfa.
district
court
thoroughly
C. The
balanced the equities in accordance
with the traditional four-part test for
injunctive relief.
Petitioners' assertion that the district court
applied a "special rule" for NEPA cases instead of
balancing the four traditional factors is not supported
by the court's decision. As discussed thoroughly above,
Judge Breyer concluded that the risk of biological
contamination caused by increasing the amount of
Roundup Ready alfalfa in the environment created a
sufficiently likely threat of irreparable harm. Judge
Breyer found that the balance of hardships favored
issuing an injunction because any harm to Monsanto
would be purely economic and would "not outweigh the
potential irreparable damage to the environment."
Pet.App. 72a (internal citation omitted). Additionally,
in light of NEPA's statutory purpose, Judge Breyer
found it "in the public interest to delay the further
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introduction of Roundup Ready alfalfa into the
environment while APHIS studies the environmental
consequences of such action." Pet.App. 75a. Finally, he
explicitly concluded that "plaintiffs have sufficiently
established irreparable injury and that the balance of
the equities weighs in favor of maintenance of the
status quo and against allowing the continued
expansion" of Roundup Ready alfalfa during completion
of the ErS. Pet.App. 7la.
As the arbiter who placed the weights upon the
scales, Judge Breyer was best positioned to eye the
balance. His judgment was not an abuse of discretion,
and is, therefore, entitled to deference. See eBay. 547
U.S. at 391.

II.

THE DISTRICT COURT'S INJUNCTION
RESPECTED THE WILL OF CONGRESS
BY ENFORCING NEPA'S STATUTORY
PROCEDURES AND POLICIES.

Although courts in equity have broad discretion
to fashion a remedy, their discretion is not so broad
that they can refuse to enforce a statutory scheme. The
choice before courts sitting in equity is "whether a
particular means of enforcing the statute should be
chosen over another permissible means; their choice is
not whether enforcement is preferable to no
enforcement at all."
United States v. Oakland
Cannabis Buyers' Coop., 532 U.S. 483, 497·98 (2001).
"[Al court sitting in equity cannot 'ignore the judgment
of Congress, deliberately expressed in legislation."' Id.
at 497 (quoting Virginian Ry. Co. v. Sys. Fed'n No. 40,
300 U.S. 515, 551 (1937». Although district courts
enjoy "sound discretion" to tailor injunctive relief to the
"necessities of the public interest," in the statutory
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context, Congress dermes the public interest. Hecht Co.
v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 329·31 (1944).'
These
principles do not change when applied to NEPA.
With NEPA, Congress prioritized foresight,
planning, and analysis as antidotes to "new and
expanding technological advances" that could
profoundly affect the environment. 42 U.S.C. § 4331(a).
"Once Congress ... has decided the order of priorities
in a given area, it is for the Executive to administer the
To be sure, there are cases in which this Court has concluded
that a statutory violation did not require an injunction. See, e,g.,
Amoco Prod. Co. v. Vill. of Gambell, 480 U.S. 531 (1987);
Weinberger u. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305 (1982) ; Hecht Co. u.
Bowles, 321 U.S. 321 (1944). However. these cases illustrate,
rather than undermine, the strength of the principle that courts
exercise their equitable discretion in light of the large objectives of
the statutory scheme and do not have discretion to authorize
behavior that Congress intended to prohibit.
See generally
Zygmunt B. Plater, Statutory Violatwns and Equitable Discretwn,
70 Cal. L. Rev. 524, passim (1982) . In Amoco, the large objectives
of the statute were designed to protect subsistence resources. and
the district court expressly found that exploration activities would
not significantly restrict subsistence uses. 480 U.S. at 544.
Therefore, an injunction requiring statutory compliance was not
required. Similarly, in Weinberger, this Court concluded that the
Navy's training sessions off the coast of Puerto Rico, resulting in
"accidental bombings of the navigable waters," did not undermine
the statutory purpose of the Clean Water Act because "the
discharge of ordnance had not polluted the waters." 456 U.s. at
307, 315. Therefore, "[a]n injunction [was] not the only means of
ensuring compliance" with the large objectives of the Clean Water
Act. ld. at 314. Finally, in Hecht , this Court concluded that an
injunction was not mandatory because statutory compliance was
already assured. 321 U.S. at 326. In this case, however, as
explained more thoroughly in this section, the district court could
not have entered APHIS's proposed injunction and still have
fulfiUed
the statutory objectives of NEPA; informed
decisionmaking and public participation.
6
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laws and for courts to enforce them when enforcement
is sought." TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 194 (1978).
APHIS's proposed injunction would have overridden
the procedural safeguards that Congress imposed
through NEPA against rash decisions that could have
See 42 U.S.C.
significant environmental impacts.
§ 4332(2)(C). Therefore, the district court did not abuse
its discretion when it rejected APHIS's proposal and
chose to enforce NEPA's procedures .7

7 Petitioners argue that NEPA's statutory objectives only protect
"the environment" and "absent species-level harm there is no
meaningful change in the environment." Pet . Bt. 36·37. This
argument is fundamentally flawed.
Congress specifically
referenced localized harms by requiring environmental impact
statements to include "the relationship between local short-term
uses of man's environment and the maintenance and enhancement
of long-term productivity," 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C)(iv) (emphasis
added) . Petitioners' argument also ignores the fact that NEPA
contextualizes the significance of environmental impacts. 40
C.F.R. § 1508.27(a) \,[T]he significance of an action must be
analyzed in several contexts such as society as a whole (human.
national), the affected region. the affected interests, and the
locality.") .

Petitioners are also wrong to suggest that NEPA's statutory
objectives only protect the environment, not individuals or people.
Prior to the fmal passage of NEPA, Senator J ackson, one of
NEPA's chief sponsors, articulated the relationship between
humans and the environment from the Senate floor. "An
environmental policy is a policy for people. Its primary concern is
with man and his future."
115 Congo Rec. 40,416 (1969).
Congress's declaration of national environmental policy supports
Senator Jackson's statement. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 4331(c)
(declaring that "each person should enjoy a healthful environment"
(emphasis added)); id. § 4331(b)(4) (stating that NEPA protects
"an environment which supports diversity and variety of
indivi.dual choice" (emphasis added».
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"A court must exercise this [equitable discretion]
'in light of the large objectives of the Act."' Albemarle
Paper Co. u. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 416 (1975) (quoting
Hecht, 321 U.S. at 331). This Court has described
NEPA's large objectives as the twin aims of informed
decisionmaking and public participation.
Dep't of
Transp. u. Pub. Citizen, 541 U.S. 752, 768 (2004); Bait.
Gas & Elec. Co. u. Natural Res. De/. Council, Inc., 462
U.S. 87, 97 (1983). Neither of these objectives would be
satisfied by APHIS's proposed injunction, which would
have timed the NEPA analysis to postdate the release
of Roundup Ready alfalfa, authorized an uninformed
agency decision, and substituted an evidentiary
hearing for NEPA's public process. Had the district
court allowed APHIS to shunt NEPA's procedures to
the side, to be accomplished in the aftermath of a
decision made-and implemented-it would have
abused its discretion by adopting a remedy that
undermined the procedural scheme Congress adopted
to achieve NEPA's large objectives and would have
substituted the "chancellor's clumsy foot for the rule of
law ." Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 335
(1982) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
A. To inform decisionmaking, a NEPA
analysis must be conducted before the
decision is implemented.

The difference between the injunction that the
district court adopted and the injunction APHIS
proposed was timing: and timing is critical to enforcing
NEPA's large objectives. The district court's injunction
insured that the agency's NEPA analysis would precede
the widespread, commercial dissemination of Roundup
Ready alfalfa; while under APHIS's injunction, the
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analysis would have postdated the release.
The
difference in timing between these two injunctions is
the difference between enforcing and not enforcing
NEPA's objectives, where the unanalyzed activity
threatened environmental injury. APHIS's proposed
injunction would have allowed the "continued and
dramatic growth of the Roundup Ready alfalfa market."
Pet.App. 64a. It could have authorized a five-fold
increase in acreage planted before APHIS had gathered
the missing information about how (and whether)
biological contamination could be avoided. Pet.App.
64a. In other words, APHIS's injunction would have
allowed the agency to implement a decision and
analyze it later.
Because this approach stands NEPA on its head,
the district court was well within its discretion to issue
an injunction. Under NEPA, agencies must include a
"detailed statement" on the environmental impacts of
every proposed (not implemented) action significantly
affecting the quality of the human environment and
compile a description of adverse environmental impacts
that cannot be avoided if the proposal is implemented.
42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C); see 40 C.F.R. § 1500.1(b).
NEPA is not about data gathering for the sake of
gathering data; rather, it should inform a proposed
agency action.
Environmental impact statements
should be useful analytic documents that promote
informed decisionmaking, not tomes filled with
information, gathering dust on a shelf. See 40 C.F.R.
§ 1502.2(a) ("Environmental impact statements shall
be analytic rather than encyclopedic."). NEPA is all
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about informed decisionmaking. To accomplish this
purpose, the process must precede the decision. s
The district court's injunction also preserved
APHIS's ability to choose among reasonable
alternatives prior to taking action on Monsanto's
request for deregulation. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.14 (agencies
should "[r]igorously explore and objectively evaluate"
all reasonable alternatives including a "no action"
alternative). In contrast, like squeezing a tube of
toothpaste, APHIS's injunction would have foreclosed
the "no action" alternative by releasing Roundup Ready
alfalfa into the environment without a viable means of
re-containing it. If the court had authorized APHIS's
approach, it would have foreclosed the critical "no
action" alternative of not deregulating at all, thereby
allowing the agency to commit resources to a course of
action before it completed its NEPA analysis. See 40
C.F.R. § 1502.2(1) ("Agencies shall not commit
resources prejudicing selection of alternatives before

Of course, that does not mean that an injunction must issue in
every NEPA case in which there is an analytical flaw. "The grant
of jurisdiction to ensure compliance with a statute hardly suggests
an absolute duty to do so under any and all circumstances, and a
federal judge sitting as a chancellor is not mechanically obligated
to grant an injunction for every violation of law:' Weinberger , 456
U.S. at 313. Whether the agency can still make an informed
decision despite a NEPA violation is a fact -specific inquiry better
suited to individual cases rather than broad generalizations.
NEPA's procedural requirements '''ensur[e] that the agency, in
reaching its decision, will have available, and will carefully
consider,
detailed
information
concerning
significant
environmental impacts.'" Winter, 129 S. Ct. at 376 (quoting
Robertson u. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 350
8

(1989)) .
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making a fmal decision" ); see also id. § 1506.1(a)(2)
("Until an agency issues a record of decision . . . no
action concerning the proposal shall be taken which
would
[lJimit the choice of reasonable
alternatives.").
The bottom line is this: NEPA documents should
not justify decisions already made. [d. § 1502.2(g). But
that is precisely what APHIS's EIS would have done if
the district court had adopted an injunction allowing
further release of Roundup Ready alfalfa into the
environment before the EIS was completed.
By rejecting APHIS's injunction, and prohibiting
further Roundup Ready alfalfa plantings or sales, the
district court preserved the opportunity for APHIS to
comply with NEPA, and thereby required APHIS to
"abide by the limitations prescribed by the
Legislature." Wilderness Soc'y v. Morton, 479 F.2d 842.
892 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
B. APHIS's proposed injunction would have
undermined NEPA's requirement that
environmental analyses inform agency
decisions.

The complete deregulation of Roundup Ready
alfalfa will destroy the livelihoods of conventional and
organic alfalfa farmers and generate Roundup-resistant
superweeds.
See JA 109, 111, 135 (comments
submitted to APHIS); see JA 678-79 (declaration).

The complete deregulation of Roundup Ready
alfalfa will create a negligible risk of cross-pollination
and will have no significant impact on the emergence of
Roundup-resistant superweeds. See Pet.App. 160a,
401a (declarations).
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The respective accuracy of each of these oversimplified positions (and all possibilities in between) is

unknown because APHIS's NEPA analysis failed to
take a hard look at these and other potentially
irreversible
environmental
impacts
prtor
to
deregulating Roundup Ready alfalfa.
Without
understanding the environmental impacts that
threatened environmental harm, APHIS could not
make an informed decision about releasing Roundup
Ready alfalfa.
NEPA reqUITes informed decisionmaking.
Agencies must, "to the fullest extent possible,"
systematically integrate the natural and social sciences
in planning and in decisionmaking.
42 U.S.C.
§ 4332(2)(A). However, here, numerous aspects of
APHIS's
environmental
assessment
revealed
foreseeable, but unanalyzed, impacts that threatened
environmental harm.
For example, APHIS never
analyzed the cumulative impact caused by a dramatic
increase in the use of glyphosate as a fertilizer and the
consequent possibility that Roundup-resistant weeds
could develop. Pet.App. 47a. As the district court
noted, other Roundup Ready crops, including corn and
soybeans, have already been deregulated and more
deregulation petitions are pending.
Pet.App. 47a.
Alfalfa is the fourth largest crop in the United States,
the flrst large-scale perennial Roundup Ready crop,
and the first crop in which APHIS acknowledged on the
record that there is a chance of gene transmission.
Pet.App. 27a, 45a, 47a. Adding it to the mix may have
significant consequences for the quality of the human
environment. Pet.App. 45a. Failure to investigate
these cumulative impacts violated Congress's mandate
that "all agencies of the Federal Government shall ...
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[identify] the relationship between local short-term
uses of man's environment and the maintenance and
enhancement of long-term productivity." 42 U.S.C.
§ 4332(2)(C)(iv).
APHIS also failed to analyze impacts on organic
farmers, on export markets, and on the availability of
non-genetically modified alfalfa.
NEPA protects
"historic, cultural and natural aspects of our national
heritage," as well as "an environment which .supports
diversity and variety of individual choice." 42 U.S.C.
§ 4331(b)(4). A federal action "that eliminates a
farmer's choice to grow non~genetically engineered
crops, or a consumer's choice to eat non-genetically
engineered food," Pet.App. 44a, should have been
thoroughly analyzed, particularly where it threatens
environmental injury. In furtherance of Congress's
policies set out in NEPA, APHIS must analyze these
impacts before authorizing the planting of one million
acres of Roundup Ready alfalfa.
Reviewing courts should base their decisions on
the administrative record and should not substitute
their judgment for that of the agency. Citizens to
Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416
(1971). Where the administrative record is silent,
district courts properly remand, rather than conduct
fact-finding procedures in the first instance. As Chief
Judge Friendly once noted. "preservation of the
integrity of NEPA necessitates that the [agency] be
required to follow the steps set forth in § 102 [42 U.S.C.
§ 4332], even if it now seems likely that those steps will
lead it to adhere to the present result." City of New
York v. United States, 337 F. Supp. 150, _00 (E.D .N.Y.
1972). To do otherwise would shortcut the process that
Congress committed in the rlIst instance to the
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responsible federal agency.
885, 891·92 (1st Cir. 1973).

Jones v. Lynn, 477 F.2d

The district court properly recognized this
principle when it refused to render an independent
judgment about wbether APHIS's proposed conditions,
not analyzed in the environmental assessment,
eliminated the likelihood of environmental injury
caused by cross-contamination. Pet.App. 67a. "To
make the findings requested by defendants would
require this Court to engage in precisely the same
inquiry it concluded APHIS failed to do ... without the
benefit of all the relevant data and, importantly,
without the opportunity for and consideration of public
comment." Pet.App. 68a. Far from violating due
process, Pet. Br. 51, this approach respected Congress's
unequivocal dictate that "the policies, regulations, and
public laws of the United States shall be interpreted
and administered in accordance with policies set forth
in this chapter." 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (emphasis added).

Where, as here, the agency has failed to make an
informed decision pursuant to NEPA's procedures,
district courts cannot make up for the lapse by
conducting an evidentiary hearing, as requested by
Petitioners, and by deciding in the frrst instance the
desirability of the proposed action. Far from an abuse
of discretion, the judicial restraint exercised by the
district court protected "the integrity of the fact·finding
process mandated by Congress m 42 U.S.C.
§ 4332(2)(C)." Jones, 477 F.2d at 892.
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C. Conducting an evide ntiary hearing to
d ecid e wheth e r Rou n dup Read y a lfalfa
sh o uld b e r eleased w it h o u t a NEPA
analys is w ould have undermine d NEPA's
a im of public participation.
The affidavits of experts proffered by APHIS and
Monsanto on the effectiveness of APHIS's proposed
injunctive measures cannot remedy APHIS's failure to
analyze whether biological contamination was
avoidable, as NEPA requires. See Pet.App. 66a-67a.
"NEPA procedures must insure that environmental
information is available to public officials and citizens
before decisions are made and before actions are
taken." 40 C.F.R. § 1500.1(b); see also id. § 1501.1(a);
Dep't of Transp., 541 U.S. at 768 (Agencies must ''have
available, and.
. carefully consider, detailed
information concerning significant environmental
impacts" prior to taking any major federal action.).
Monsanto and APHIS gathered the expert affidavits
after APHIS made its deregulation decision, so they
were divorced from the other features of a NEPA
analysis, like the requirement to "study, develop, and
describe appropriate alternatives ... in any proposal
which involves unresolved conflicts."
40 C.F.R.
§ 1501.2(c).
The restrictions in APHIS's proposed injunction,
based on expert affidavits. were not made available to
the public. 40 C.F.R. § 1500.1(b). Because the experts'
affidavits were no substitute for the NEPA process, the
district court properly rejected Monsanto's argument
that these affidavits could change the balance of
equities. Where Congress has established the public
interest, as articulated in a statute's large objectives,
courts should enforce that judgment, "[flor the
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standards of the public interest not the requirements of
private litigation measure the propriety and need for
injunctive relief." See Hecht, 321 U.S. at 33l.
By prohibiting further sale and distribution of
Roundup Ready alfalfa, the district court followed
Congress's directive that the "policies, regulations, and
public laws of the United States shall be interpreted
and administered in accordance with [NEPAJ." 42
U.S.C. § 4332. This decision, far from an abuse of
discretion, respected the priorities expressed by
Congress in NEPA. See TVA, 437 U.S. at 194.
CONCLUSION
The judgment of the court of appeals should be
affirmed.
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Appendix A
FORMER GENERAL COUNSELS TO THE COUNCIL
ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY
Dinah Bear is an attorney based in Washington,
D.C. After briefly serving as deputy General Counsel,
she served for twenty-three years as the General
Counsel to the Council on Environmental Quality
(CEQ), the environmental agency in the Executive
Office of the President. CEQ's responsibilities include
advising the President on environmental matters,
overseeing federal agencies' implementation of NEPA,
and coordinating interagency implementation of
environmental law and policy. She has taught, and
continues to teach, NEPA courses for numerous federal
agencies, the American Law Institute, the American
Bar Association, and the Nicholas School of the
Environment at Duke University. She has chaired the
American Bar Association's Standing Committee on
Environmental Law and the District of Columbia Bar
Association's Section on Environment and Natural
Resources.
Gary Widman served as the General Counsel to
the CEQ in the administrations of Presidents Nixon
and Ford, from 1974 through 1976. Before and after
his time at CEQ, he was a Professor of Law at the
University of California, Hastings College of the Law.
He also served as Associate Solicitor for Conservation
and Wildlife in the Department of the Interior during
the Carter administration, as counsel to the
Washington, D.C. office of the Fulbright & Jaworski
law firm, as Director of the Office of Staff Attorneys for
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit from
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1985 to 1987, as an attorney with the San Francisco
law fIrm of Bronson, Bronson, & McKinnon, and as
Chief Counsel of the California State Department of
Parks and Recreation.

LAW PROFESSORS
Robert Glicksman is the J .B. & Maurice C.
Shapiro Professor of Environmental Law at George
Washington University Law School, teaching in the
fields of administrative, environmental, natural
resources, and property law. He is an accomplished
environmental and natural resources law scholar with
over sixty book chapters and articles to his credit. He
co-authored
an
environmental
law
casebook,
Environmental Protection: Law and Policy; the
casebook Administrative Law: Agency Action in
Context ; a treatise, Public Natural Resources Law; a

monograph, Risk Regulation at Risk: A Pragmatic
Approach; and Modem Public Land Law in a Nutshell.
Oliver Houck is Director of the Environmental
Law Program and Professor of Law at Tulane
University Law School. He teaches in the fields of
environmental, natural resources, and criminal law.
He previously served as General Counsel to and VicePresident of the National Wildlife Federation. He has
published widely on environmental, administrative,
and constitutional law, including over forty book
chapters and articles, and he is co-editor of a popular
book on the history of environmental law,
Environmental Law Stories. He remains an active
participant in litigation involving biological diversity
and consults with foreign governments on the
development of their environmental laws.
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Daniel Mandelker is the Howard A. Stamper
Professor of Law at the Washington University in St.
Louis School of Law, teaching in the fields of land use,
environmental, and state and local government law.
He has published numerous books, monographs,
chapters, and articles on these and related fields of law.
He is the author of the leading treatise on NEPA law,
NEPA Law and Litigation; the co-author of a popular
law school casebook, Planning and Control of Land
Development; the author of the comprehensive treatise
Land Use Law; co-author of a property law casebook,

Federal Land Use Law and Property Law and the
Public Interest; and a co-author of a casebook on state
and local government, State and Local Government in a

Federal System.
Thomas McGarity is the Joe R. and Teresa
Lozano Long Endowed Chair in Administrative Law at
-the University of Texas at Austin School of Law.
teaching in the fields of administrative law.
environmental law • food safety law. and torts. In these
and related fields, he has published over seventy
articles and authored or co-authored eight books,
including Bending Science: How Special Interests
Corrupt Public Health Research (co-author); The Law of
Environmental Protection (co-author); and Reinventing

Rationality: The Role of Regulatory Analysis in the
Federal Bureaucracy.

Robert Percival is the Robert F_ Stanton
Professor of Law and Director of the Environmental
Law Program at the University of Maryland School of
Law.
He teaches in the fields of administrative,
constitutional, environmental,
and comparative
environmental law. He is principal author of the most
commonly used environmental law casebook in the
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nation, Environmental Regulation: Law, Science &
Policy, and is the co-author of the forthcoming casebook
Global Environmental Law.
He has also written
extensively on regulatory policy, federalism, and legal
history and has presented environmental law
workshops on six continents. He is an elected member
of the American Law Institute.

Zygmunt Plater is a Professor of Law at Boston
College Law School. He teaches in the fields of
administrative, environmental, property. and land use
law. He has litigated, and consulted on, a number of
important cases involving administrative and
environmental law, and has taught on seven law
faculties in this country and abroad. He is lead author
of a casebook on environmental law, Enuironmental
Law and Policy: Nature, Law, and Societ)', and has
published widely on environmental law issues,
equitable discretion, administrative law, private and
public rights in land and resources, and related fields.

Nicholas Robinson is the Pace University
Professor on the Environment and the Gilbert and
Sarah Kerlin Distinguished Professor of Environmental
Law at Pace University School of Law as well as CoDirector for that law school's Center for Environmental
Legal Studies.
He teaches in the fields of
environmental and historic preservation law.
He
participated in the development of NEPA regulations
as a Member of the Legal Advisory Committee to the
President's Council on Environmental Quality from
1970 to 1972, advising CEQ on the implementation of
NEPA. after it was first adopted. He has published
numerous books, chapters, and scholarly articles on
environmental, energy, international, and land use
law, including Climate Change Law: Mitigation and
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Adaptation (co·author) and New York Environmental
Law: A Legal Treatise. He has advised and represented
governments and drafted treaties and laws on
environmental issues at the international, state, and
municipal levels. From 1983 to 1985, he served as
Deputy Commissioner and General Counsel to the New
York
State
Department
of
Environmental
Conservation, advising New York on its compliance
with NEPA and revising the regulations for New York's
Environmental Quality Review Act (New York's "Little
NEPA").
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